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Creating Collaborative Communities: 
Management Networks, Services Cooperation, and Metropolitan Governance 
Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 
October 31, 2005 
 
 
Conference Paper Abstracts 
Arranged in Alphabetical Order by Lead Author 
1.  An Economic Perspective on Coordination, Cooperation, and Consolidation in the Delivery of Public 
Services 
Soji Adelaja, John A. Hannah Distinguished Professor in Land Policy 
and Director of the Land Policy Program 
Michigan State University 
adelaja@msu.edu
 
With approximately 1,800 local communities in Michigan, with many of them operating independently in 
the delivery of services to their residents, there is a need to explore the potential public service cost savings 
benefits from coordination, cooperation, and outright consolidation (3Cs).  All three forms of interactions 
have transactions in management costs, the dynamics of which could impact on the potential to realize 
benefits for taxpayers.  Direct evidence of the benefits of these interactions are not well documented in the 
case of Michigan, but are important in motivating communities to consider joint activities. Potential 
collaborators need not only to know that others may have tried these interactions in the past, but also that 
they benefit from them. 
This paper focuses on an economic perspective on the cost associated with the 3Cs in explaining the 
challenges associated with managing coordinated, cooperative, and consolidated relationships.  The 
presentation presents research of interest to scientists in Michigan working together to develop relevant 
research to inform public policies related to the 3Cs. 
 
2.  Interlocal Contractual Arrangements in the Provision of Public Safety 
 
Simon A. Andrew, Doctoral Candidate 
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy 
Florida State University 
simonandrew@mindspring.com
 
The range of interlocal contractual arrangements in the realm of public safety in Florida provides a research 
site to examine the extent to which these arrangements have been used by local governments. We 
developed a contractual perspective on interlocal contractual arrangements as relational contracts by 
arguing that their institutional designs are partly an effort of involved parties to reduce transaction costs 
that are the product of the properties of the services themselves; and partly by state statutes that allowed 
mix approaches to contractual arrangements. A relational contract is advantageous because it specified the 
activities to be rendered without unnecessarily intruding on the authority of the other jurisdictions. It is 
nonobligatory, voluntary, and easily terminated without legal consequences to either party. Alternatively, in 
the presence of regional politics and avoid future disputes, municipality and county governments can 
choose a more legally binding contract by using non-relational contract such as interlocal agreements, 
contracts or leases. Utilizing the data compiled by the Florida Department of Community Affairs, we 
identified 2,251 interlocal contractual agreements in the provision of public safety. Our results show that 
there is a positive and significant association between city-county relations and the type of contractual 
arrangement chosen to govern those relations. There are also evidence when specialized investment 
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required in the provision of public safety services, a non relational contract was preferred; and when 
measuring and monitoring the outcomes of the services are relative difficult, a relational contract was 
preferred. A single functional service area with similar policy and goal preferences also affected the 
transaction costs of negotiating, operating, and enforcing contractual arrangement; so did the number of 
collaborators involved in an agreement. 
 
 
3.  The Politics of Interlocal Cooperation: A Theory and a Test 
 
Kenneth Bickers, Professor of Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
University of Colorado 
Bickers@Colorado.edu
 
The underlying theoretical question addressed in this paper is how to make sense of the emergence or non-
emergence of collaborative activities among local jurisdictions within policy domains characterized by 
multiple, overlapping governments.  In this paper, I focus specifically on key factors that contribute to 
successful interlocal collaboration measured in terms of the receipt of federal funds.  The argument 
developed below begins with the generation of spillovers by federal grants, spillovers that create incentives 
for interlocal collaboration.  The likelihood that local jurisdictions are able to capitalize on such 
collaboration, however, is argued to be tempered by three sets of factors: first, the geographic proximity 
and density of local jurisdictions that might be involved in collaborative initiatives; second, the distribution 
of preferences of constituents within and across jurisdictions for types of collective goods; and third, the 
geographic scope and financial scale of the federal grant awards.  Data from the 1997 Census of 
Governments and from the Federal Assistance Awards Database are utilized to test this argument for local 
collaborative efforts in more than twenty metropolitan areas during the late 1990s. 
 
 
4.  Which Local Governments Cooperate on Public Safety? Lessons from Michigan 
 
Jered B. Carr, Assistant Professor 
Department of Political Science 
Wayne State University 
jcarr@wayne.edu
 
Kelly LeRoux, Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
Wayne State University 
kleroux@wayne.edu
 
Despite the increased interest in voluntary services cooperation, little is known about the factors that 
encourage local governments to enter into collaborative services arrangements with each other.  This paper 
addresses this question through an analysis of interlocal contracting arrangements for police and fire 
services reported by 464 local governments in Michigan.  While the contracting of public services is 
increasing common in local governments across the country, collaborations on police and fire services have 
proved far more difficult to achieve.  Public safety contracting presents a dilemma for public managers.  On 
one hand, local governments devote a substantial part of their budgets to police and fire, and public safety 
employees may approach 25 percent of the unit’s workforce and 40 percent of its total payroll.  Given the 
importance of public safety expenditures in the budgets of local governments, it may be impossible to 
reduce the costs of local government without reducing spending on police and fire services.  Yet the fear of 
lost jobs and lower quality services will often make contracting for police and fire highly controversial in 
the community.  Also, collaborations involving police and fire services may become entangled with the 
“politics of place.”  Unlike other services areas where the contractor may be a private or nonprofit 
organization, public safety contractors are other local governments, and the baggage of past conflicts and 
rivalries attach to the issue.  We group the factors expected to influence the incentives and feasibility of 
local governments to collaborate on public services into the following categories: the organization of local 
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governments in the county and variations in the unit’s administrative structure, community demographics, 
and the fiscal capacity of the local unit.  Using logistic and negative binomial regression, we analyze the 
effect of these factors on the frequency and extent of cooperation reported for police and fire services.  We 
find important differences in the role played by these factors in the frequency and extent of cooperation 
reported across the two different service areas and within the different types of local units (city, village, and 
township). 
 
 
5.  Exploring Contextual Factors Influencing Interlocal Collaboration 
 
Yu-Che Chen, Assistant Professor 
Department of Political Science 
Iowa State University 
ycchen@iastate.edu
 
Ricardo S. Morse, Assistant Professor 
Public Policy and Administration Program 
Department of Political Science 
Iowa State University 
rmorse@iastate.edu
 
Lois Wright Morton, Associate Professor 
Department of Sociology 
Iowa State University 
lwmorton@iastate.edu
 
Our research contributes to the growing literature on collaborative public management by exploring 
empirically some of the contextual factors that explain variation in collaborative activity. Using a sample of 
99 small cities in Iowa, we are testing several variables that may influence the extent of interlocal 
collaboration for each municipality. We look to internal factors such as community social capital, 
population, tax burden, professional management, trust in government, and information technology 
infrastructure and usage. We also test external contextual factors such as whether the city is in a 
metropolitan or micropolitan region (the latter being a new classification used by the Census Bureau). We 
find that the majority of theory and empirical research focuses on metropolitan areas. Here we examine 
patterns of collaboration in metro and non-metro small cities, thus examining the importance of the 
regional context, along with other community-level factors. This paper will use formal agreements (called 
“28e” agreements in Iowa, following the state statute they fall under) as the dependent variable, and data 
from an extensive survey of 99 small cities, along with other variables from the Census Bureau and other 
sources, as independent variables. 
 
 
6.  Institutional Collective Action and Local Governance 
 
Richard C. Feiock, Augustus B. Turnbull Professor of Public Administration 
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy 
Florida State University 
rfeiock@coss.fsu.edu
 
This paper elaborates the institutional collective action framework and its applications to cooperative 
interlocal service agreements among governments in metropolitan areas.  It begins by outlining the 
information, negotiation, enforcement and agency cost that pose obstacles to cooperative interlocal 
arrangements.  Next it identifies how these transaction costs, and the ability of local actors to overcome 
them, depend on:  1) characteristics of services;  2) characteristics of communities;  3) political institutions; 
and 4) structures of policy networks.  Specific propositions regarding evolution and effectiveness of 
interlocal cooperation are advanced and an agenda to investigate institutional collective action among local 
governments is presented. 
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7.  Public Administration and Shared Power: Understanding Governance, Networks, and Partnerships 
 
H. George Frederickson, Distinguished Professor of Public Administration 
Department of Public Administration 
University of Kansas 
gfred@ku.edu
 
David Matkin, Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Public Administration 
University of Kansas 
matkin@ku.edu
 
Starting with the “consolidationist” and “fragmentationist” arguments in American local government and 
contemporary patterns of increasing jurisdictional cooperation and regionalization, this paper examines 
patterns of jurisdictional cooperation and power sharing in metropolitan regions, and analyses the influence 
of extrajurisdictional benefits on local government decisions to engage in regional agreements. 
 
Our findings are based on a survey of local government officials in the Kansas City Metropolitan area.  
Cooperation is examined using an Axelrod-type prisoner’s dilemma scenario.  Participants include elected 
officials, chief administrative officers, and department-level administrators—Police Chiefs, Parks and 
Recreation Directors, Fire Chiefs, and Public Works Directors.  Results point to differences in patterns of 
jurisdictional cooperation between elected officials and administrators.  In addition, our analysis 
demonstrates how cooperation is affected by jurisdictional traits, such as population size and geographic 
location. 
 
 
8.  Cooperative Municipal Service Provision: A Political-Economy Framework for Understanding 
Intergovernmental Cooperation  
 
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Professor of Public Policy  
and Director, Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy 
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 
University of Michigan 
ergerber@umich.edu
 
Clark C. Gibson, Professor of Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
University of California, San Diego 
ccgibson@ucsd.edu
 
We develop and apply a theoretical framework for understanding how local governments perceive the costs 
and benefits of intergovernmental cooperation. Our theory connects local government decisions to 
economic and political costs and benefits at both the local and regional levels, as well as the institutional 
context in which collaborative decisions take place. 
 
 
9.  Networks of Local Governments: Examining Community Conferences as Mechanisms for Achieving 
Interlocal Cooperation 
 
Kelly LeRoux, Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
Wayne State University 
kleroux@wayne.edu
 
This study examines community conferences, a type of voluntary association of local governments to 
determine the effectiveness of these organizations in brokering several types of regional cooperation 
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including service-sharing arrangements. Network analysis is used to model patterns of service 
arrangements among eighteen urban communities to examine the link between service sharing and their 
affiliation through the community conference. Findings suggest that community conferences are effective 
networks for providing some forms of unduplicated services such as social service functions, and for 
achieving regional political representation, but they are not as effective in coordinating and integrating 
municipal services. 
 
 
10.  Characteristics of Service, Network Structure, and Forms of Interlocal Cooperation in Service 
Production: Evidence from Florida 
 
Manoj Shrestha, Doctoral Candidate 
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy 
Florida State University 
Ms03h@garnet.acns.fsu.edu
 
This paper empirically examines the interrelationships between service characteristics and the structure of 
networks among local jurisdictions using relational data across a set of diverse services from Pinellas 
County in Florida. In metropolitan areas, cities as well as counties work together to become increasingly 
efficient in public service delivery, and hence, engage into a variety of cooperative arrangements such as 
bilateral or multilateral service agreements. Increasing restraints on jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity have 
further forced them to look for cooperative avenues. Extant literature suggests that types of public goods 
and services determine the choice of service production. Policy/management network scholars argue that 
different public goods and services lead to different collective action problems, which in turn, result in 
different network structures among actors. What is missing is that why certain public goods and services 
lead to certain network structure of service production. This paper pulls together institutional collective 
action, contracting, and policy/management network literature and argues that the attributes of services – 
asset specificity and metering difficulty - create different collective action problems that jurisdictions 
attempt to solve which then result different network structures leading to different forms of inter-local 
cooperation. 
 
 
11.  Elements of Successful Interlocal Agreements: An Iowa Case Study 
 
Kurt Thurmaier, Professor and Director  
Public Policy and Administration Program 
Department of Political Science 
Iowa State University 
kthur@iastate.edu
 
This paper explores the factors that contribute to successful interlocal agreements. Success is defined in 
terms of achieving agreement objectives, increasing the effectiveness of the public service, and increasing 
the efficiency of the public service. Influential factors of interest include the reason the interlocal 
agreement was created, the estimated costs and benefits of participation in the agreement, and the types and 
levels of communication between the parties to the agreement.  The paper reports results from a survey of 
local governments (including cities, counties, school districts) in Iowa that have filed an agreement with the 
state. The sample of about 1250 respondents includes most of the major cities and counties in Iowa and 
many smaller governments as well. Results suggest that the most important reasons for creating agreements 
are to improve effectiveness and efficiency of services, and that most local governments are very satisfied 
with the success of the agreements. 
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12.  The Nature of Metropolitan Governance in Urban America: A Study of Cooperation, Conflict, and 
Avoidance in the Kansas City Region 
 
Curtis H. Wood, Assistant Professor 
Division of Public Administration 
Department of Political Science 
Northern Illinois University 
chwood@niu.edu
 
In this study I determine the dominant pattern of governance in the Kansas City metro based on interviews 
with 46 city administrative officers in cities over 2,500 in population. Consistent with theories of 
cooperation, I found that the dominant governance strategy is intergovernmental cooperation in the delivery 
of public services punctuated by conflict and avoidance/defection when intergovernmental service delivery 
arrangements involve infrequent interaction between the parties and when the presence and influence of the 
regional council of government is minimal.  
 
 6
